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The State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), enacted by Congress with strong bipartisan
support as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(BBA), created a much-heralded new program to assist
states in covering uninsured, low-income children. As
the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) prepares to
issue final regulations implementing the program,1
virtually every state and territory in the country already
has implemented an SCHIP program, and more than
half of them provide coverage to children in families
with income levels at or above 200 percent of the
poverty line.2 HCFA reports that nearly 2 million
children, at some point during the year,3 were covered
in 53 SCHIP programs during the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1999, including about 1.2 million in
stand-alone SCHIP programs and almost 700,000
through SCHIP-funded Medicaid expansions.4
Yet, despite the enthusiasm generated by the early
experience under SCHIP, several thorny health policy
questions remain unanswered. Principal among them is
whether the complex design of this program—including
capped and ultimately declining federal funding levels,5
strict targeting rules designed to prevent the “crowding
out” of private insurance and Medicaid coverage, and
federal subsidies that increase with rising family
income—represent a lasting architecture for reducing
the number of uninsured Americans. Some policy
analysts assert that SCHIP represents more of a transitional policy that has at least begun the task of stimulating efforts to cover more uninsured farther up the
income ladder. Others go farther and call the program
a temporary policy whose internal tensions make it
difficult for it to function as a transitional vehicle
toward covering significant numbers of the uninsured.
In developing SCHIP (by adding Title XXI to the
Social Security Act), Congress had to reconcile many
conflicting political views that were brought to bear
after the demise of the Clinton administration’s universal health coverage initiative in 1993. As a result, the
statute creating SCHIP is ambivalent in many ways.6
While increasing the federal role in financing coverage
for low-income children, Congress promised to give
states more latitude in how to spend the money than
under Medicaid (for example, states are allowed to cap
SCHIP spending and enrollment). SCHIP reflects both
generosity and parsimony on the part of the federal
government. While SCHIP is supposed to help states
cover more low-income children, Congress also took
steps to protect the federal purse. Under the law, the
new SCHIP funds (with a higher federal match rate than

that paid to Medicaid) are not supposed to be used for
health insurance for children already eligible for Medicaid or covered by private insurance. Thus, on one hand,
the new, juiced-up federal funding under SCHIP was
targeted at populations earning more than those eligible
for Medicaid but, on the other, was not supposed to
crowd out of any form of existing coverage, including
that offered by either Medicaid and employers.
One of the last major unresolved sets of issues in
the implementation of SCHIP has to do with the
program’s capacity to subsidize the provision of
employer-sponsored insurance. With certain strings
attached, states can use SCHIP dollars to subsidize
employer-sponsored coverage either for children alone
or for families that include eligible children. States
must apply for a federal waiver to subsidize family
coverage but not to subsidize children alone with
SCHIP dollars. Under HCFA’s proposed rules implementing SCHIP, states may apply for a waiver allowing them to use SCHIP funds to purchase “family
coverage under a group health plan or health insurance
coverage that includes coverage for targeted lowincome children” if the state establishes that the
coverage is “cost-effective” and would not substitute
SCHIP funds for (or crowd out, to use health policy
vernacular) other forms of coverage.7 HCFA defines
cost-effectiveness in this part of the regulations to
mean that federal funds provided to states for subsidizing family coverage shall not exceed what would have
been paid under the program to cover eligible targeted
children in a regular stand-alone SCHIP program.
So far, HCFA has given approval to three states—
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Wisconsin—to implement premium subsidy programs under SCHIP. Aside
from some limited experience under Medicaid going
back about a decade, programs merging federal and
state funds to subsidize private health insurance coverage are a new concept posing a steep learning curve for
policymakers at all levels of government.8 Iowa has one
of the nation’s most-developed programs that uses
Medicaid funds to pay for employer-related and other
private health insurance for Medicaid-eligible people.
Begun in 1991, the program now serves about 8,000
participants. Using SCHIP funds to subsidize employersponsored coverage has drawn a great deal of interest
among state policymakers, in part because SCHIP’s
federal matching rate and eligibility limits are both
higher than those for Medicaid.9 Yet many state officials have expressed a great deal of frustration with
what they perceive as federal barriers (either statutory
or regulatory in origin) to implementing premium
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subsidy programs under SCHIP. The points they raise
include the following:








In general, federal requirements are overly complex
and rigid, thereby making subsidy programs difficult
to administer and raising administrative expenses.
Federal requirements designed to limit the crowding
out of existing coverage and federal cost-effectiveness standards are unreasonably strict and raise
issues of equity in how different types of employees
and employers might fare under SCHIP.
Federal requirements for benefits and cost-sharing
are not consistent with private-sector employee
benefit plans (therefore, in many instances, states
have to add significant supplemental coverage,
which can be a difficult and costly undertaking).
States are not in a position to enforce federal requirements regarding the characteristics of
employer-sponsored health plans or regarding access
to appeals processes because the state has no direct
contractual relationship with the employer plan
(eligibility is triggered when employees apply at a
state office).

Many state officials and policy analysts interviewed are
taking a wait-and-see attitude toward premium subsidy
efforts under SCHIP. While most are generally supportive of giving this approach a try, many question whether it can cover many children in its present form. HCFA
officials say they are considering states’ concerns in
developing the final SCHIP rules.
Organized labor has also expressed interest in
exploring ways that SCHIP funds can be used to
subsidize health insurance for uninsured dependents of
workers covered by union-negotiated health plans
(which can be operated either by employers or by
unions themselves). Recently, the AFL-CIO and several
national unions have begun discussions at both the
federal and the state level about how they might work
with states, not only to facilitate the development of
SCHIP subsidy programs, but also to expand current
efforts to make sure that people eligible for Medicaid
and SCHIP sign up.

THE BACKDROP:
BUILDING ON MEDICAID
So far, the employer subsidy efforts represent only
a tiny part of the SCHIP program’s spending and
enrollment. SCHIP, in turn, is a modest-sized federal/state program that sits on top of a much larger one:

Medicaid. In creating SCHIP, the BBA appropriated
$24 billion over five years and $40 billion over ten
years to help states expand health insurance to children
whose families earn too much to qualify for Medicaid,
yet not enough to afford private insurance. In 1998,
about 12 million American children and 32 million nonelderly adults lacked health insurance. Of the uninsured
children, 4.2 million were in families earning less than
100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), 3.8
million were in families earning 100 to 199 percent of
the FPL, and 1.8 million were in families at 200 to 299
percent of the FPL.10
Enacted along with Medicare in 1965 and expanded several times thereafter, Medicaid is an entitlement program that pays for medical assistance for
certain vulnerable and needy individuals and families
with low incomes and resources, while leaving many
other types of low-income people uncovered. All the
states have a Medicaid program (though they are not
compelled to have one). In fiscal year 1998, about 41
million Americans were enrolled in Medicaid at some
point during the year (HCFA estimates about 32
million people at any given point in time), costing
federal and state taxpayers a total of about $168
billion (not including some administrative costs and
disproportionate share payments).11 Although children
and adults in low-income families make up nearly
three-quarters of Medicaid enrollment, most Medicaid
spending goes toward the elderly, blind, and disabled.
In fiscal year 1998, Medicaid provided medical
coverage for more than 19 million children at some
point during the year.
Although Medicaid is the largest source of funding
for medical and health-related services for the nation’s
poorest people, as noted above, the program does not
cover all poor persons.12 The following are some of
the major categories of people automatically eligible
for Medicaid:






Individuals who would have met the (pre-federalwelfare-reform) Medicaid requirements for the
AFDC program that were in effect in their state on
July 16, 1996 (states have the option to set more
liberal criteria).
Children under age six whose family income is at or
below 133 percent of the FPL.
Pregnant women whose family income is below 133
percent of the FPL (services to women are limited to
those related to pregnancy, complications of pregnancy, delivery, and postpartum care).

4



Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients in
most states (some states use more restrictive Medicaid eligibility requirements that pre-date SSI).

Most categories of low-income adults are not automatically eligible for Medicaid. States generally have broad
discretion in determining which groups their Medicaid
programs will cover and the financial criteria used to
establish Medicaid eligibility.13 The BBA presents
states with three basic choices for structuring their
SCHIP programs. They may (a) create a new state
children’s health insurance program or enlarge an
existing one; (b) expand their current Medicaid programs by raising eligibility limits; or (c) use a combination of the two approaches.
Because SCHIP dollars are not supposed to cover
previously insured children, Medicaid income standards
in place in each state as of March 1997 establish the
lower boundary for eligibility for that state’s SCHIPfunded coverage.14 The breadth of SCHIP-funded
coverage in a state depends on both these lower eligibility boundaries and the upper SCHIP eligibility boundaries, both of which vary widely across states. Lowerincome limits under SCHIP for children up to one year
of age, for example, range from 133 percent of the FPL
(in 17 states) to 275 percent of the FPL (in 1 state).
Upper-income limits for SCHIP programs approved by
HCFA currently range between 100 percent and 350
percent of the FPL. (HCFA notes that the upper-income
levels of SCHIP do not necessarily reflect the upper
boundaries of a state’s publicly funded coverage for
children, in part because of Section 1115 demonstration
programs. Some states have used Section 1115 programs to expand children’s coverage under Medicaid
and are using SCHIP funds for only a limited part of
this coverage.)
Although SCHIP dollars by definition are targeted
at populations with greater incomes than those covered
by Medicaid, the program offers states a much more
generous match rate than under Medicaid. The portion
paid by the states under SCHIP is 30 percent less than
the historic state Medicaid rate. Under SCHIP, state
matching requirements range from 15 percent to 35
percent of the total cost of medical assistance, in
contrast to the 23 percent to 50 percent states are
responsible to pay under Medicaid. (For example, if a
state’s match rate is 50 percent under Medicaid, it drops
to 35 percent under SCHIP. The federal matching rate
for SCHIP is capped at 85 percent of total program
costs.) (While the total number of dollars that states
may draw down under SCHIP is capped, there is no cap
under Medicaid.)

It should be noted that the federal welfare reform
law enacted in 1996 gives states an opportunity (littlerecognized outside Medicaid circles) to use Medicaid
funds to provide health coverage to low- and modestincome working parents. Section 1931 of the Social
Security Act permits states to use Medicaid dollars to
cover populations not specifically eligible for Medicaid
by offering states the option of setting their own income
and resource requirements when determining Medicaid
eligibility for families.15 By allowing families with
higher incomes and assets to qualify for Medicaid,
states can cover families with higher incomes and
extend transitional Medicaid assistance to parents
entering the workforce. States may even eliminate the
resource (asset) test altogether. So, states are able to
reach the same populations through Medicaid as they
can through SCHIP, but they have an incentive to do so
through SCHIP, when possible, due to the program’s
higher federal match rate. Section 1931, however, does
not provide states with a mechanism to provide health
coverage for single low-income adults or childless
couples, only those with children.

SUBSIDIZING EMPLOYER COVERAGE:
SCHIP’S FINAL FRONTIER
While SCHIP dollars may not, by law, crowd out
employer-provided coverage, they may be used to
subsidize it and, as noted above, several states are
interested in trying this approach. So far, only Massachusetts has done so to any appreciable extent.

Federal Strings
States interested in using SCHIP funds to subsidize
employer-sponsored coverage must meet a number of
federal requirements, including crowd-out prevention
measures, cost-effectiveness rules, employee costsharing limits, and benefits levels. Because of these
complex rules, federal officials have cautioned states to
weigh the costs of program administration against the
benefits of insuring more children.16 A particularly
burdensome aspect of administering premium subsidy
programs in both the SCHIP and Medicaid environments, some analysts say, is that states have to ensure
that many requirements are met on a case-by-case basis.

Crowd-Out Rules
In February 1998, HCFA issued a letter to state
officials outlining rules designed to insure that SCHIP
funds used to subsidize employer-sponsored plans would
end up covering previously uninsured children, not those
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already insured. According to the letter, children have to
be without group health insurance for at least the previous
6 months to be eligible (states can require a longer period
of uninsurance, lasting up to 12 months). Second, to
discourage employers from reducing their existing
contributions for dependent coverage, states may subsidize with SCHIP dollars only where the employer contributes at least 60 percent of the cost of family coverage (if
states can show the average employer contribution rate is
lower in a particular state, HCFA may consider a lower
contribution requirement for that state’s subsidy program).17 Third, a cost-effectiveness test is applied to
ensure that the state subsidy to the employer plan does not
exceed what the state would have paid to cover eligible
children in SCHIP or Medicaid. Fourth, families electing
to receive the subsidies must apply for the full premium
contribution available from the employer. Fifth, states
must collect information on and evaluate the amount of
coverage substitution, if any, that has occurred under the
subsidy program.
While federal and state officials are taking steps to
prevent SCHIP funds from crowding out existing coverage, estimates of how much crowding out is going on or
might occur (as well as the importance of this phenomenon) vary widely, according to a report published in May
1999 by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO).18 In
analyzing the SCHIP legislation, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that, in the long run, about 40
percent of SCHIP participants would have had some other
type of coverage. The GAO also reported an Urban
Institute projection of crowd-out ranging from 22 percent
to 39 percent of SCHIP enrollees. Recent evidence of
crowd-out has surfaced in Rhode Island. The Providence
Journal has reported that up to 20,000 Rhode Islanders
have dropped private coverage to join Rite Care, a state
program financed with Medicaid and SCHIP funds.19
Consultants working with the state program, however,
estimate that the number is lower—somewhere between
4,000 and 8,000 of the 104,000 people in Rite Care.

noted that most of the equity issues that arise in the
context of subsidizing employer coverage through
SCHIP also present themselves in the larger SCHIP
program.

Benefit Benchmarks
Premium subsidy programs must provide benefits that
meet SCHIP benchmarks. Under the statute, states may
choose one or more benchmark plans from among three
options: (a) the commercial health maintenance organization (HMO) plan in the state with the largest enrollment,
(b) the state employee plan, or (c) the Federal Employees
Health Benefit program standard-option preferred provider organization. Programs can qualify either by
providing one of the benchmark benefit packages or by
offering coverage deemed to be “benchmark-equivalent.”
Because most employer plans do not conform to these
benchmarks and many offer lesser levels of benefits,
states often must cover additional benefits (sometimes
referred to as “wrap-around coverage”) in order for that
coverage to qualify for SCHIP subsidies. It should be
noted that the benefit package required under Medicaid
coverage is much more comprehensive than what is
required under SCHIP.

Cost-Sharing
Employer coverage provided with SCHIP subsidies
must meet the same cost-sharing requirements as those
applied under the regular SCHIP program. There may
be no cost-sharing requirements for well-baby and wellchild visits. Families with incomes below 150 percent
of the FPL may pay no more than the Medicaid-level of
copayments, which includes a cap of $5 for office
visits. Families with incomes exceeding 150 percent of
poverty may pay no more than 5 percent of their total
income for cost-sharing in a given year including both
premium contributions and cost-sharing required at the
point of service.

Equity Concerns

TARGETING

Requiring recipients to be without group health
insurance for at least six months to qualify for SCHIP
premium subsidies raises several questions of fairness.
For example, among employees at a firm offering
insurance but requiring a substantial employee premium
contribution, those who have been paying the contribution would not be eligible for government subsidy, while
those who had gone uninsured would be eligible. So,
some free riders arguably might be rewarded, while
those who had acted responsibly would not. It should be

Subsidized Coverage versus a Stand-Alone
Program
One of the arguments in support of covering lowincome children by subsidizing family coverage offered
in the workplace instead of enrolling them in a separate
public program is that family coverage may make it
more likely that children will use preventive services
and other forms of medical care. It is well established
that uninsured people use significantly fewer medical
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services than insured people. Recent research shows
that the primary parent’s use of physician services is a
strong indicator of whether a child would use physician
services, whether they happened to be insured or not.20
Because of this link, some argue that it is best that
children and their parents are insured in the same plan.
But others point out that using employment-based
coverage to subsidize low-income children’s health
coverage has several inherent limits. One is that their
parents’ employment is often not stable. Many lowincome people jump from one job to another and in and
out of employment, creating many opportunities for a
child’s health coverage to be interrupted if it is based on
a parent’s place of work. Another factor is that families
are not always stable. (It is only fair to note, however,
that Medicaid programs experience high turnover rates
as well.)
Most states interested in using SCHIP dollars are
interested in subsidizing entire families. Due to federal
cost-effectiveness rules and the administrative burdens
inherent in the program, it is questionable that this
approach will end up covering many families—at least
in its current form.

Employment-Based Coverage
A government strategy of subsidizing employmentbased coverage for lower-income people requires
several preconditions, many of which are outside the
control of government officials. For this approach to
work, a worker’s employer first must offer coverage.
Second, the employee has to be eligible under the
employer’s plan. Third, the government subsidy has to
be large enough to enable the employee to afford the
coverage. Of course, the employee has to know about
the subsidy option, apply for it, and qualify. Finally, the
employer (or union) plans must qualify for subsidization and their administrators must be willing to work
with whatever requirements are attached to the government subsidy program. In 1997, 83 percent of firms
offered coverage for at least some workers.21 Among
those firms offering coverage, 84 percent of employees
were eligible for it. Of those employees eligible, 87
percent signed up for coverage. So, after netting out the
effects of employees’ being ineligible and declining
coverage, only 60 percent of employees were covered
(although 83 percent of firms offered coverage).
In implementing premium subsidy programs, some
policy experts point out that it will be easier for states
to target them toward employees of large firms because
almost all larger firms offer coverage, while many
smaller firms do not. (In 1997, 99 percent of firms with

500 or more employees offered health coverage, while
55 percent of firms with fewer than 50 employees
offered it.) On the other hand, the families of people
working for small firms are far more likely to have
lower incomes and be uninsured—that is, to qualify for
SCHIP subsidies. (In 1997, the coverage rate was 76
percent in firms with 500 or more employees, compared
to 38 percent in firms with fewer than 50 employees.)
Using a subsidy approach to reach employees at small
firms often involves a more complex strategy. If the
employer does not offer a plan or the employee is not
eligible for a plan, there is nothing to subsidize. The
Institute for Health Policy Solutions, which is providing
technical assistance to states attempting to implement
SCHIP subsidy programs, has estimated that more than
one in three uninsured children may have access to an
employer plan offered to one or both or their parents
(with the caveat that the percentage of children falling
in income categories eligible for SCHIP may be different because the data is not adjusted to account for
variance in access to employer coverage based on
family income).

STATE EXPERIENCES
As mentioned above, HCFA has approved applications by three states to subsidize employer-provided
coverage under SCHIP. As of this writing, the Massachusetts program has covered several hundred people through
SCHIP premium subsidies after two years, while Wisconsin’s SCHIP subsidy program managed to cover only a
few families after about one year. Mississippi is still
attempting to implement its program. The following are
brief descriptions of efforts to implement the programs in
these states. Several other states interested in beginning
such subsidy programs also have approached HCFA. The
approaches proposed in two of those states, Maryland and
Oregon, are described as well.

Massachusetts
Under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act,
Massachusetts gained federal approval of a five-year
Medicaid research and demonstration project with a
broad policy objective of increasing health insurance
coverage while curbing the growth of the state’s disproportionate share hospital and uncompensated care pool
expenses. At the end of the demonstration program’s
second year (state fiscal year 1999), the program’s total
enrollment was more than 776,000.
The Section 1115 waiver gave the state authority to
subsidize employer-based insurance with Medicaid
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dollars. Massachusetts Medicaid officials have developed
parallel premium subsidy programs, one utilizing federal
Medicaid funds and the other SCHIP funds. Under the
state’s premium assistance program, SCHIP funds are
used only for uninsured families, while Medicaid funds
can be used to subsidize premiums for currently insured
families. After two years, the program subsidizes a total
of about 7,000 people with employment-based coverage
(3,815 children covered by 1,837 family policies) and also
purchases about 500 policies for adults, according to a
state official. The vast majority of these people are
subsidized with Medicaid funds. Only a few are subsidized with SCHIP dollars, partly because the administrative complexity of doing so is greater.
Massachusetts implemented SCHIP as a mixed
model that includes both a stand-alone program and a
Medicaid expansion. Children with incomes between
150 percent and 200 percent of the FPL may receive
SCHIP coverage two ways, either directly or through
the premium subsidy program (called the MassHealth
Family Assistance Program). If families have access to
suitable employer-based coverage, they must take it in
order to receive assistance (instead of enrolling in the
stand-alone program). Premium subsidy payments are
made in one of two ways, either directly to families or
to employers via fiscal intermediaries.
Among the reasons that the state developed a premium assistance program are that officials believed that
many of the people in the targeted income range had
access to employer coverage and they wanted to take
advantage of private dollars already available to go
toward premium payments. Officials also believed that
people would be more likely to accept assistance for a
program that resembled private coverage rather than a
separate public program. They also believed that children would fare better in the same plans as their parents.
The subsidy program is one part of Massachusetts’
multi-faceted approach to increase coverage. The state
also is offering employers currently not providing health
plans incentive payments equaling $1,000 for family
coverage, $800 for dual coverage (for example, two
adults or an adult and a child), and $400 for one adult if
they begin offering a plan (if they have employees who
are eligible under either subsidy program). By May 1, 122
employers were receiving payments under this program.
According to state officials, Massachusetts has
negotiated some flexibility from federal regulators that
may have facilitated the development of its premium
subsidy program. For one thing, under its Section 1115
waiver, the state is allowed to tap into Medicaid funds

to cover previously insured people. Also, under both the
Medicaid waiver and the SCHIP initiative, the state
gained federal approval to subsidize job-based coverage
in instances where an employer contributes only 50
percent of premium (as compared to the 60-percent
employer contribution typically required for subsidies
under SCHIP).

Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s SCHIP premium subsidy program has
been up and running for one year. Despite considerable
effort by state officials and a not insignificant investment in computer technology used to determine eligibility, by the end of July 2000 only five families (or a total
of 20 people) will have been found to be eligible for the
subsidy program.
Under a federal waiver, state officials have tapped
into both Medicaid and SCHIP funds to develop a
program called BadgerCare, basically targeted at
families with incomes too high for Medicaid. Children
and their parents with income at or below 185 percent
of the FPL are eligible and, once enrolled, may remain
in BadgerCare until family income exceeds 200 percent
of the FPL. Begun about one year ago, the program so
far has enrolled more than 60,000 people (representing
about 25,000 “cases”). A state official characterized
enrollment in BadgerCare as “phenomenal,” noting that
about two-thirds of the targeted population already has
signed up. The official also said that there was evidence
that some people had dropped their employer coverage
a few months before enrolling.
As part of their strategy to keep families covered in
the same health plans, state officials built the SCHIP
employer coverage subsidy program—called the Health
Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP) program—into
BadgerCare and developed a computer system to
determine eligibility for subsidies as a routine part of
the application process. If a person with income too
high for Medicaid comes in to apply for assistance, state
officials first determine whether he or she is eligible for
BadgerCare. Once a person is found eligible for
BadgerCare, officials begin the process of determining
his or her eligibility for the employer subsidy program.
First, they call to ask who the person’s employer is.
Once that is determined, the computer system generates
a form that state officials mail to the employer, asking
a series of questions to ascertain the employee’s eligibility for SCHIP subsidies (for example, the employer’s
contribution level and benefit levels). If there is no
response in 28 days, officials attempt to contact the
employer. After 56 days, if no contact has been made,
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they enroll eligible applicants in a BadgerCare HMO,
which offers coverage similar to that provided to
Medicaid recipients. (While people are waiting for
evaluation of their eligibility for premium subsidies, the
state covers them under BadgerCare on a fee-forservice basis.) In about 65 percent of the 25,000 cases
to date, state officials have received information back
from employers—information that is often bulky,
misleading, and outdated. Of the employers responding,
31 percent reported that the BadgerCare recipient in
question was no longer employed by them. (One reason
for this is that up to three months can elapse between
the beginning of the BadgerCare application process
and the end of the HIPP program eligibility process.)
From the information they receive from employers, state
officials discover that many people are ineligible
because the employer’s contribution rate is less than 60
percent of premium (breaking the federal limit) or
greater than or equal to 80 percent (exceeding a state
limit). This is the main factor causing the majority of
BadgerCare recipients to fail the HIPP eligibility
process. The second major reason is the nature of the
health coverage offered by their employers; in many
cases, the coverage available to employees is too
limited to qualify for subsidy under the law.
For those applicants still possibly eligible, the
employer-provided information is fed into a computer
program to determine the employee’s eligibility for
SCHIP premium subsidies. According to a state official,
to determine whether the subsidy program will be costeffective, the computer program compares (a) the cost of
paying for BadgerCare HMO coverage along with a small
fee-for-service wrap-around to (b) the cost of paying the
premium subsidy plus any necessary benefit and copayment wrap-arounds plus the state’s cost of administering the program. The difference between the cost of the
benefit wrap-around for BadgerCare HMOs (about $5 a
month because the HMOs cover most benefits required by
Medicaid) and the benefit wrap-around for the employer
plan may be quite large because a private-sector plan’s
level of coverage may require the state to pay for additional benefits costing up to $150 a month to meet federal
benefit requirements.
Given the steps they must go through for people to
qualify for the subsidies, state officials say it comes as
no surprise that only a few families have qualified,
despite the deluge of information from employers.
Nevertheless, state officials have no plans of discontinuing the subsidy program and say that whatever they
might learn from the exercise could be very valuable in
the future, should federal rules be made more flexible.

Mississippi
After gaining HCFA approval, officials in Mississippi hired the largest insurer in the state (Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Mississippi) to help administer the
state’s SCHIP program to subsidize employment-based
coverage. The insurer has identified several administrative issues that state officials say may prevent them
from implementing the program. For one thing, the
insurer has determined that only about 10 percent to 15
percent of employer plans in the state would qualify for
SCHIP subsidies. Mississippi is a largely rural state
with almost no HMOs and many small employers.
While most employers offer dependent coverage, they
often do not contribute towards it, thereby violating
HCFA’s employer contribution rule. In applying to
HCFA, Mississippi officials made the argument that the
agency’s requirement that employers pay at least 60
percent of the premium was not necessary due to the
presence of the cost-effectiveness rule. HCFA officials
did not buy this argument but did agree to lower the
employer contribution requirement for Mississippi’s
program to 50 percent of premium.
Most plans in Mississippi also have employee costsharing requirements that exceed SCHIP’s limits. State
officials say that, due to several factors, the employer
subsidy program may be so expensive as to violate the
cost-effectiveness test under SCHIP. These factors
include the general cost of meeting SCHIP requirements, the cost of creating and administering wraparound benefit packages, and the cost of providing the
wrap-around benefits themselves.

Maryland
Maryland state officials plan to subsidize employer
coverage as part of an SCHIP coverage expansion.
Beginning July 1, 2001, Maryland children whose
family income is greater than 200 percent of FPL and at
or below 300 percent of poverty will be eligible to
enroll in the program. If employer-sponsored coverage
meeting federal and state requirements is not available,
eligible children will be enrolled directly in a managed
care organization offering the same services as currently
provided under the state’s Medicaid plan (called
HealthChoice) for children at or below 200 percent of
poverty. For employer-provided health plans to be
eligible for subsidization under the program, the benefits must be equivalent to a benchmark plan. Maryland
has selected the HMO with the largest commercial,
non-Medicaid enrollment in the state as its benchmark
plan.
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According to a state Medicaid official, some members of the state legislature worried that the decision to
subsidize workers with incomes up to 300 percent of
the FPL might lead some employers to drop coverage
for all workers. In preparing to implement the program,
a key issue that has arisen has been how to get employers to participate; many have said that they would not
be interested in participating if doing so means the
imposition of any additional administrative burdens.
This sentiment by employers has been echoed in many
other states as well.

Oregon
Discussions between officials from the state of
Oregon and HCFA have bogged down regarding how
to use SCHIP dollars to fund an employer insurance
subsidy program that the state currently operates
without any federal money. After the state’s comprehensive “pay or play” health reform legislation was
repealed in 1995, the state legislature in 1996 voted to
create the Family Health Insurance Assistance Program
(FHIAP). Under this program, families can obtain
subsidies to help them buy either employer-provided or
individual health coverage. About 5,500 people are
enrolled in FHIAP and more than 15,000 others are on
a waiting list. A state official described current efforts
to mesh the subsidy program with SCHIP as going
through “contortions” to fit employer-sponsored insurance into a Medicaid-like template. State officials are
not sure if it is possible to do so.
State officials say that they have encountered two
major difficulties in gaining approval from HCFA. One
of these is meeting SCHIP’s cost-sharing limits. The
state is proposing to use an employer purchasing
cooperative, which is organized by a business association and offers a choice of three federally qualified
HMOs as the vehicle through which to subsidize
employer coverage. Proposing a rather creative approach towards bolstering benefit packages to meet
federal cost-sharing rules, state officials have suggested
that families choosing to enroll in a plan offered by the
cooperative be given two insurance cards. One card
would carry the name of whichever HMO they chose,
while the other card would cover additional costs if the
plan fails to meet federal SCHIP cost-sharing requirements. If this approach is rejected, an alternative might
be to develop new coverage packages that meet the
federal SCHIP cost-sharing requirements; but the
disadvantage of this approach is that some employers
might object to having to offer different employees
different benefit packages (in some instances, for

example, SCHIP-eligible employees would be offered
richer benefits than their co-workers).
The second major difficulty the state faces in gaining
federal approval has to do with the federal requirement
that children that appear to be eligible for Medicaid must
apply for that program before applying for SCHIP.
According to a state official, leaders of the privately
organized purchasing cooperative are leery of routinely
asking subsidy applicants to apply for Medicaid because
they do not want the purchasing cooperative to develop
a reputation for running a Medicaid plan. State officials
have proposed that, instead of being told to apply for
Medicaid, subsidy applicants would have to be informed
that they appear to be eligible for Medicaid and have the
right to apply for Medicaid instead of a subsidy for
employer-sponsored insurance.
State officials said that, despite the complexity
inherent in attempting to mesh the existing state subsidy
program with SCHIP, they feel that they must try do so
because thousands of eligible Oregon children remain
uninsured. Between 25 percent and 30 percent of
children in Oregon who are eligible for Medicaid remain
unenrolled and the percentage of unenrolled children is
somewhat higher among those eligible for SCHIP, they
estimate. About one in three of the state’s uninsured
children have parents that declined to cover them
through employer-sponsored insurance. In many instances employers in the state will pay up to 90 percent
of the premium for a worker’s coverage but are willing
to contribute much less, if anything, toward premiums
for dependent coverage. HCFA’s fear that enhanced
subsidies might crowd out employer coverage is shared
at the state level, but state officials think that, if federal
rules can be made more flexible, employer-sponsored
insurance can be strengthened through SCHIP.

CONCLUSION
Given the considerable hurdles that states must
overcome, it seems unlikely that they will be able to
cover a significant number of uninsured children
through programs accessing SCHIP funds to subsidize
job-based health coverage. Although states have
focused much criticism on HCFA for its interpretation
of the SCHIP’s crowd-out provisions, many of the
barriers to the growth of these programs appear to be
erected by the BBA statute itself. And many other
barriers are presented by the dynamic nature of
employment-based coverage and the inherent complexities of merging government and private insurance
programs. The law contains almost contradictory
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elements because it seeks to provide health coverage to
uninsured people with incomes higher than those
eligible for Medicaid without inducing both employers
and employees currently paying for coverage to drop it.
That is a fine line for state officials to walk when
attempting to implement a complex program.
There is little doubt that HCFA has some discretion
and could take steps to make the subsidy programs
easier to implement and administer (for example, by
relaxing the 60 percent employer contribution requirement). But it appears probable that interpreting the law
as flexibly as possible, which many states are clamoring
for, would go only so far and that the growth of such
subsidy programs would remain inherently limited
under the current statute.

6. For more information on this aspect of SCHIP, see
Richard Hegner, “The State CHIP: How Much Latitude Do
the States Really Have?” Issue Brief No. 725, National Health
Policy Forum, George Washington University, October 1,
1998; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Kay Johnson, Colleen
Sonosky, Anne Markus, and Chris DeGraw, “The Children’s
Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program,”
Health Affairs, January/February 1998, 76-77.
7. HCFA, “State Child Health,” 60962.
8. Institute for Health Policy Solutions (IHPS) and National
Governors’ Association (NSA), “Coordinating State Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: Design and Implementation of Premium Assistance Programs,” summary of conference, October 5, 1999, Washington, D.C. This document
provides a good summary of early experiences under premium subsidy programs and identifies many of the issues that
have arisen.

Yet the importance of such efforts should not be
underestimated. Despite the limits and contradictions
inherent in using SCHIP to subsidize employer coverage, state experiments that attempt to do so may generate a great deal of valuable experience and practical
knowledge. Developing on-the-ground experience on
how to mesh government subsidies with employer
coverage would take on new importance should Congress at some point consider expanding efforts to
subsidize health coverage for working Americans in a
more comprehensive and systematic way.

9. The state matching rate under SCHIP is 30 percent less
than the historic state Medicaid rate. Thus, if a state’s current
rate is 50 percent under Medicaid, it drops to 35 percent
under SCHIP. The federal matching rate for SCHIP is capped
at 85 percent of total program costs; thus, state matching
requirements range between 15 and 35 percent, compared to
23 to 50 percent for Medicaid.
SCHIP offers states the option of covering uninsured
children with family incomes up to 200 percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL), using capped federal funds with a
significantly higher federal matching rate than for Medicaid.
For states whose Medicaid eligibility levels already exceeded
150 percent of the FPL, eligibility limits under SCHIP may
exceed those levels by as much as 50 percentage points. As
a result, some states have chosen SCHIP eligibility standards
as high as 300 percent of the FPL.
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